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A Gravity Approach to Evaluate the Significance of Trade Liberalization  
in Vertically-Related Goods in the Presence of Non-Tariff Barriers  
 
1. Introduction 
Taking a long view of trade liberalization, it is apparent that the global trading system is in a 
critical transition period. Between the Great Depression and World War II, industrial tariffs 
averaged about 40% or roughly ten times the current average (OECD, 2003). In some sense, the 
work initiated in the 1940's to lower tariffs on industrial goods is nearly complete. However, the 
state of trade in agri-food commodities is comparable to that of industrial goods 60 years ago as 
it is still in its infancy. Gibson et al. (2001) estimated that the average tariff on agricultural 
products at the end of the Uruguay Round (UR) implementation period was about 60%.  
Most of the lessons that were learned from liberalizing trade in industrial products still 
apply even though the distinguishing features of agri-food markets add a whole host of modeling 
issues. For instance, non-tariff barriers can be applied to various degrees to different, but 
vertically-related, products in a given marketing chain. In this context, comprehensive 
liberalization plans must recognize the vertical linkages between the upstream and downstream 
industries as farm policies impacts on the competitiveness of primary producers and processors 
alike. Agriculture has always been a politically sensitive sector and this is why it was for all 
practical purposes ignored in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) prior to the 
UR and why it is so difficult for World Trade Organization (WTO) members to reach an 
agreement in the current Doha Round.   
The objective of the paper is to develop a gravity-based model in the spirit of Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003) to explain bilateral trade flows of processed agri-food commodities and 
primary agricultural products. Our theoretical framework yields empirically tractable bilateral 
trade flow equations that are estimated to analyze the impacts of trade liberalization scenarios in 
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the cattle/beef markets. We chose these products for several reasons. First, the simultaneous 
import and export (or cross-hauling) of cattle and beef is common. Second, the trade position of 
a particular country in cattle is often different from its trade position in beef. Third, tariffs, and 
domestic and export subsidies vary a lot from one country to another. The European Union’s 
(EU) tariff and export subsidy on bovine meat are both in excess of 100% while Australia does 
not intervene at all. Fourth, non-tariff barriers, like sanitary regulations, are notoriously 
disruptive. As a result, exporters have to tailor their products to meet the importers’ regulations 
in the spirit of Grossman and Helpman (2005).     
Our model features two important structural parameters: the elasticity of substitution for 
bovine meat and the cattle elasticity of transformation. The former elasticity measures the 
consumers’ ability to substitute meats from different origins while the latter captures the ease 
with which an exporter can substitute one destination for another. Our elasticity of substitution 
estimate is lower than what has been reported for the aggregate manufacturing sector by Lai and 
Trefler (2004) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). This supports the hypothesis that there is 
significant product differentiation at the consumers’ level with respect to the origin of beef. Even 
though explicit transaction costs (such as tariffs and transportation) are accounted for in the 
model, the estimate of the elasticity of transformation is quite low. This is consistent with the 
presence of significant impediments to substituting cattle exports across markets from the 
exporters’ perspective. Simulations are performed to analyze the impacts of tariffs and/or 
subsidy reductions on trade flows of cattle and beef. As far as we know, we are the first to 
explicitly account for support policies and to propose a new approach to estimate the 
restrictiveness of non-tariff barriers in a gravity model. 
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The econometric studies pertaining to the liberalization of the cattle/beef sector are 
usually limited to a narrowly defined geographic area, like Wachenheim, Mattson and Koo 
(2004)’s analysis of the North American beef and cattle trade or Kim, Kim and Veeman (2004)’s 
study about the South Korean beef market. In contrast, gravity models are typically estimated on 
data sets involving a large number of countries. However, most of the empirical gravity 
applications have relied on highly aggregated manufacturing data (e.g. Eaton and Kortum, 2002; 
Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Lai and Trefler, 2004) and could not analyze the impact of 
trade liberalization in primary agricultural goods and in processed foods.  
The impact of trade liberalization is often analyzed with Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) models (e.g., Fabiosa et al, 2005; Hertel and Martin, 2001). While in 
principle they could be highly disaggregated, they too usually rely on highly aggregated 
products. CGE models are sometimes criticized on the ground that the value of the parameters 
are either borrowed from other studies or are based on educated guesses. The fact that the 
parameters are not jointly estimated means that they may not be mutually consistent with one 
another. Calibration techniques can be used to attenuate this problem as some coefficients can be 
adjusted to better replicate a period of reference, but the CGE modeller often does not know the 
confidence interval around each parameter and hence does not know what constitute a 
“reasonable” adjustment. The lack of statistical support is also problematic because it prevents 
the construction of confidence intervals around simulated trade flows.1 We address this issue by 
building confidence intervals around predicted trade flows using bootstrap methods. This allows 
us to test hypotheses about changes in trade positions induced by trade liberalization.    
                                                 
1 Abdelkhalek and Dufour (1998) propose a method to bring “statistical objectivity” in assessing the uncertainty 
about simulation results of CGE models, but their approach has not been widely used in practice. 
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Two issues had to be addressed for the successful estimation of the empirical 
specification of our model. First, there is a significant number of zeros in trade flows for many 
country pairs due to the disaggregate nature of the data. Ideally, the estimator must prevent the 
occurrence of simulated negative trade flows.2 Second, there is a simultaneity issue associated 
with the cattle bilateral export supply functions and meat import demand schedules. Ignoring this 
issue would result in biased parameter estimates and hence unreliable trade flow predictions.  As 
a result, a type 1 Tobit model is used to address the corner solution outcomes in the data and the 
potential simultaneity bias is tackled with instrumental variable estimation techniques. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the 
theoretical foundations of our gravity model. It highlights the vertical linkages between the cattle 
and beef sectors. The third section describes the data and the econometric procedure used to 
estimate the structural parameters of the model. The fourth section presents results from various 
liberalization scenarios and discusses their policy implications. The United States (US) and 
Australia emerge as the exporting countries that stand to benefit most from trade liberalization as 
the EU and Japan significantly increase their imports of beef. Canada’s trade position in the beef 
sector would deteriorate while Argentina’s trade position would improve. The last section 
reviews the main results and their implications in the context of the troubled Doha Round.   
 
2. The Theoretical Model 
Consider a world with Z  countries and S  processing sectors producing consumer-ready goods. 
The S  sectors are characterized by differentiated varieties and increasing returns to scale in 
production. We assume that each variety is produced by one firm and that there are a total of Mszn  
                                                 
2 The modeling of zeros is insightful in its own right because some of the factors conditioning the probability of 
export are influenced by policies.   
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firms in sector s  of country z . A two-tier consumer preference structure is assumed as in Lai 
and Trefler (2004). The upper tier is a Cobb-Douglas function over goods and the lower tier is a 
Dixit-Stiglitz Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function over varieties. The logarithm of 
the utility function for a representative consumer in country i  is: 
( ) ( )( )1
0
ln 1 ln
M
sz
s s
n
i s s s siz
s z
U m v dvσ σµ σ σ −⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∫  (1)     
where sµ  is the constant share of income spent on goods produced by sector s  with 1ss µ =∑ , 
sσ  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties specific to sector s , sizm  measures 
consumption of variety v  of sector s  of country z . Weak separability implies that the 
representative consumer maximizes the lower tier utility function subject to the budget 
constraint, ( )
0
M
szn
M M
s i sz siz sz siz
z
Y p m v dvµ τ ε=∑ ∫ , where iY  represents total income of the 
representative consumer in country i , szp  is the seller’s price in country z , 1
M
sizτ ≥  is the ad 
valorem equivalent of trade costs associated with shipping goods from country z to country i , 
1Mszε ≤  measures support policies on an ad valorem basis (e.g. production subsidy, export 
subsidy) for country z  and it is invariant across destinations. Total imports of country i  coming 
from country j  in sector s  are:  
( )
( )1
s
s
M M M
sj sij sj sjM
sij sj sij s i M M M
sz siz sz szz
p n
M n m Y
p n
σ
σ
τ εµ τ ε
−
−= = ∑ .    (2) 
Let MsjQ  represent total output of commodity s in country j. For future reference, we define the 
following identity which expresses trade flows as a fraction of total output in the processing 
sector:  
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( ) Msij sij szj sjzM M M Q= ∑   (3)                         
where 
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( )1
s
s
M M M
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szj s zz M M Mz sz szz sz szz
p n
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τ εµ τ ε
−
−
′ ′ ′ ′′
=∑ ∑ ∑ . 
The key assumption in the consumers’ utility maximization problem is that processed 
goods are differentiated. In contrast, we assume that primary goods are not differentiated on the 
basis of their intrinsic qualities. This is not a heroic assumption because commodities are often 
blended and priced based on a benchmark quality. This can only be done when differentiation is 
limited. From an analytical standpoint, the assumption that primary agricultural goods are 
homogenous from the buyers’ perspective is most convenient because it drastically reduces the 
number of consumption possibilities.  
Non-tariff barriers and sanitary regulations are notorious impediments to agricultural 
trade. Accordingly, we posit that destinations are not perfectly substitutable for exporters of 
primary agricultural goods.3 Imperfect substitutability across destinations for exports of primary 
products is modeled through a constant elasticity of transformation. This concept was first 
introduced by Powell and Gruen (1968) and was more recently used by Bergstrand (1985, 1989) 
and Baier and Bergstrand (2001). To gain some insights regarding this concept, consider the 
following heuristic interpretation. Let us assume that that the production process can be 
decomposed into two different stages. First, each firm produces an aggregate output (denoted sjι ) 
which is subsequently tailored to each particular market according to the constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET) function: 
                                                 
3 The most publicized dispute about a sanitary regulation is perhaps the EU ban on hormone-treated cattle/beef 
(Bureau, Marette and Schavina, 1998; Wilson, Otsuki and Majumdsar, 2003). Canada and the US challenged the EU 
ban on imports of hormone-treated cattle/beef, but the ban remained in effect even when WTO dispute settlement 
panels ruled that it ought to be lifted. The EU chose to be subject to retaliatory measures by the US and Canada. The 
impact of the embargo on hormone-treated cattle/beef in the empirical model will be discussed below.  
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( )( ) ( )11 s ss ssj szjz γ γγ γι ι ++= ∑   (4) 
where sγ  represents the elasticity of transformation in sector s that takes the lower value of zero 
if products are not substitutable and a value of infinity for the case of perfect substitutability 
across destination countries, and sijι  is the production by country j  exported to country i .  
The technology to produce primary goods is homothetic and is summarized by the cost 
function s ssj sj
α βρ ι , where sjρ  is a cost indicator specific to country j and sector s and , 0s sα β > . In 
our study, sjρ  is interpreted as land rents. The bilateral export supply functions of a producer in 
sector s are determined by maximizing the profit function:  
s sI I I
sj sz szj sj szj sj sjz
h α βπ τ ε ι ρ ι= −∑  (5) 
where szh  is the price of the primary good used by processing firms in sector s ; 1
I
sjε ≥  is the 
support offered by country j , and 1Iszjτ ≤  is the trade cost. Profit maximizing conditions yield 
the bilateral export supply functions:  
( )
( )
1
1 1
1
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sij s sj
I I
sz szj sjz
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h
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β β
ξγ
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− −− −
+
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  (6) 
where ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1s s s s sξ γ β γ β= − − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  and ( )1 1 0s sγ β> − >  for the second order 
conditions to be respected. Let the number of identical producers of the primary agricultural 
product s  in j  be represented by Isjn . Aggregate exports from j  to i  are: 
( )
( )
1
1 1
1
s
s
s s
ss
I I
si sij sjI
sij sj s sj
I I
sz szj sjz
h
I n
h
γα
β β
ξγ
τ εβ ρ
τ ε
− −− −
+
= ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑
.     (7) 
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For future reference, we define an identity that relates bilateral exports in (7) to total output of 
the primary commodity s in country j:  
( ) dIsij sij siz sizI I I Q= ∑  (8) 
where 
dI
siQ  is the total demand of the primary commodity in country i.  
Vertical linkages between the primary and processing sectors constrain price linkages. 
Under the assumption of monopolistic competition in the production of consumer-ready goods 
and constant average variable costs, profit maximization implies a constant mark-up pricing rule 
in the processing sector: 
 
1
sh sw srs
sj sj j j
s
p h w rθ θ θσσ= −   (9) 
where jw  and jr  are the wage and capital rent (exogenous to sector s) and shθ , swθ  and srθ  are 
the cost parameters associated with their corresponding production factors such that 
1sh sw srθ θ θ+ + = . A world trade equilibrium condition implies that total sales of the processed 
commodity s are related to total production of the primary good.   
szj sj sjzz z
M Iη=∑ ∑   (10) 
where ( )1sh sw srsj sh sj j jh w rθ θ θη θ −=  is the conversion factor between primary and processed goods. 
Substituting the pricing rule in (9) into the import demand function defined in (2) and using the 
export supply function in (7) yields the equilibrium price for the primary good in each country: 
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∑ ∑
( )1 sh s s
j
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∀
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  (11) 
3. Data and Estimation Strategy 
In what follows, the subscript s  is dropped because the empirical application focuses exclusively 
on the bovine meat and cattle sectors. Inserting (11) into the logarithm transformations of the 
identities of the bilateral trade functions in (3) and (8), and rearranging yields the empirical 
bilateral trade flows: 
( ) ( ) ( )ln ln ln ln . ln . ln .M M M M Mij i j ij j j ijM Y Q k eδ λ σ ϕ= + + − − + +  (12) 
( ) ( ) ( )ln ln ln ln . ln . ln .dI I I I I Iij i j ij i i ijI Q Q k eδ λ γ ϕ= + + − + + +     (13) 
where 
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;  
Mk  and Ik  are constant terms4, Mije  and 
I
ije  are stochastic error terms and ( ).jϕ  and ( ).iϕ  are 
specified as in (11). It is important to note that 
dI
iQ  is proxied by ( ) 1dI Mi i iQ Qη −=  in (13), using 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that the assumption of monopolistic competition has no qualitative implications in the 
empirical model as the mark-up ( )1σ σ −  is absorbed in the constant term of the regression.   
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the technological relationship (10). The denominator of ( )Mijδ ⋅  and the term ( )Mjλ ⋅  are akin to 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)’s inward and outward multilateral resistance indexes for 
trade flows of processed goods going from j to i. Naturally, an increase in trade costs for goods 
exported into i from countries other than j increases the trade flow from j into i. An increase in 
trade costs for supplier j in markets other than i causes a surge in trade flow from j into i. This 
substitution effect is captured by ( )Mjλ ⋅ . A similar interpretation applies for the primary good’s 
multilateral resistance indexes, the denominator of ( )Iijδ ⋅  and the term ( )Iiλ ⋅ .   
As in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), a multiplicative trade barrier function is 
assumed such that it can be decomposed into an ad valorem tariff and distance function. The 
trade barrier specifications for the primary cattle and the bovine meat sectors are: 
II I
ij ij ijt d
ψτ = ;  MM Mij ij ijt dψτ =   (14) 
where Iijt  and 
M
ijt  are the ad valorem tariffs on cattle and meat, ijd  is the distance between 
countries i and j and Iψ  and Mψ  are the trade barriers distance elasticities for cattle and meat. 
The ad valorem measure of support aggregates the ad valorem domestic and export subsidy 
measures. 
Transport cost proxies are important variables in gravity models. Previous studies have 
found that trade elasticities with respect to transport cost and other transaction cost variables are 
sensitive to the method used to approximate transport cost (Wei, 1996; Helliwell, 1998; Head 
and Mayer, 2000, 2002). A conventional measure is the greater circle distance between two 
economic major cities, initially introduced by Wei (1996). Some authors designed more intricate 
measures that take into consideration the dispersion of economic activity within a region. Head 
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and Mayer (2000, 2002) proposed the following indicator: ij b ab a
a i b j
d distχ χ
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ , where abdist  
is the distance between the two sub-regions a and b and aχ  and bχ  represents the economic 
activity share of sub-regions a  and b , respectively. The Centre d’Études Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) used the above formula to create their data set. Because 
the latter reports bilateral distances for EU countries individually, we applied the Head and 
Mayer equation to construct a set of bilateral indicators between the EU as a whole and non-EU 
countries. We used the same formula to compute the transport cost proxy within the EU.  The 
indicators involving non-EU countries are the CEPII estimates. 
Trade volumes of cattle ( )ijI  and bovine meat ( )ijM  were obtained from the database of 
the Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model (ATPSM, Peters and Vanzetti, 2004).5 The 
ATPSM bilateral trade volumes are reported as averages of the 1999-2001 annual trade statistics 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) trade deflator dataset. 
Trade policies are also taken from the ATPSM dataset. We rely on two separate trade policy 
variables: i) applied tariffs found in the Agricultural Market Access Database (AMAD) 
administered by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and ii) 
exports subsidies as reported by WTO member countries in their notifications to the WTO. 
Using the Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) dataset, adjustments were made to 
applied tariffs to account for preferential trade agreements. Our domestic support estimates were 
taken from the ATPSM database which relied on a UNCTAD compilation of various measures 
of domestic support that corrects for double counting when domestic and border policies are 
                                                 
5 The cattle notation is equivalent to the ATPSM livestock sector covering cattle, buffaloes, sheep and goat as 
specified in the FAO coding system. The ATPSM bovine meat sector covers meat of cattle; offals of cattle, edible; 
meat of cattle, boneless; meat of beef dried, salted, smoked; meat of buffaloes; offals of buffaloes, edible; as 
specified in the FAO coding system. 
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combined into one instrument, as in the case of an administered price for example. Domestic 
support equivalent measures in the ATPSM dataset include either 2000 or 2001 data depending 
on the country. 
Cattle prices and total production were borrowed from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) Agricultural Producer Price series and FAO Statistical Yearbook, 
respectively. Production volumes of bovine meat were collected from the FAOSTAT database of 
the FAO. Estimates of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were taken from the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook Database. Wages in the manufacturing sector 
( )jw  were collected from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
database. The price of capital ( )jr  is proxied by the price of investment in the Penn World 
Tables. We followed the approach of Antweiler and Trefler (2002) in using the GDP generated 
by livestock per unit of pasture in 1985 to proxy land rents ( )jρ  in each country. These variables 
were obtained from Tables 1.4 and 1.6 of FAO (1992). After adjustments for missing and outlier 
data, the constructed database includes 46 countries which are listed in table 1A of the appendix. 
In order to simulate trade liberalization scenarios, we must first estimate the following 
structural parameters: σ , γ  , Iψ , Mψ , β , α , hθ , wθ  and rθ . Two issues must be confronted in 
the estimation of the empirical model. First, cattle prices appear in the resistance indexes in (12) 
and (13), but from the equilibrium conditions in (10), prices and trade flows are determined 
simultaneously. Second, zeros are found for 64% of the cattle trade flows and for 42% of the 
meat trade flows. The left hand-side truncation in the data is addressed with a standard type 1 
Tobit procedure as in Haveman, Nair-Reichert and Thursby (2003) and Redding and Venables 
(2004).  
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The simultaneity issue could be addressed by relying on full information Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) techniques, but they are generally computationally intensive (Wooldridge, 
2002), especially so in the present case because of the pronounced nonlinearity in the parameters 
appearing in the multilateral resistance terms. Instead, we use the two-step algorithm of Nelson 
and Olsen (1978). In the first stage, a reduced form approximation for cattle prices in (11) was 
used to generate predicted cattle prices. In the second stage, the zh ’s in (12) and (13) were 
replaced by the predicted values, and the cattle and beef bilateral trade functions were estimated 
by ML subject to the censoring rule. The two-step Nelson and Olsen (1978) algorithm yields a 
consistent estimator when there is a well defined linear projection of the reduced form.6 A Non-
linear Least squares (NLS) estimator could have been used to estimate (12) and (13), but it was 
not implemented because of the high proportion of zeros in the dataset and the fact that the 
variance of NLS estimators is known to be variable in the neighbourhood of corner solutions.7  
The first stage of our econometric estimation involves estimating a linear approximation 
of the reduced form for the cattle price defined in (11):   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13
ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln ln ln
I M M I M M
j j j j j j j j
I
j j j j j j j
h d t t t t
w r n n Y u
ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ε ϑ ϑ ϑ ε
ϑ ϑ ϑ ρ ϑ ϑ ϑ
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +  (15)  
where GDPj z jzz jd dω≠≡∑  is a remoteness variable (Helliwell, 1998) based on the GDP weight of 
country z  ( )GDPzω  relative to the aggregate GDP of its trading partners, Ijt  and Mjt  are the 
applied tariffs for cattle and meat respectively, Mjε  is the support policy of country j , 
                                                 
6 Blundell and Smith (1989) show that efficiency gains can be achieved using a similar two-step procedure when the 
reduced form is linear.  
 
7 Efficiency gains could be achieved from using weighted NLS in the second stage, but the weights would have to be 
arbitrarily selected. Khan and Lewbel (2007) propose a weighted two-stage LS estimator for censored problems that 
is robust to various forms of heteroskedasticity. Its applicability to a non-linear truncated model like ours remains to 
be investigated. 
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, , ,M I M I M I
j zj zjz
t tω≡∑  is an average outward tariff for cattle and meat with ,M Izjω  the export weight 
of country j to country z  relative to total exports, , , ,M I M I M Ij jz zzε ω ε≡∑  is an inward support 
policy variable, jw , jr  and jρ  are respectively the wage rate, the price of capital and land rent as 
defined before, Ijn  and jn  are measures of the size of cattle and bovine meat sectors 
respectively, jY  is proxied by GDP and ju  is assumed to be a well-behaved stochastic error 
term.  
The OLS results of the cattle price equation in (15) are reported in table 1. Column (i) 
presents the most general specification for cattle prices while column (ii) presents a more 
parsimonious specification.8 The latter was obtained by excluding individual variables that were 
not significant at the 10 percent level, starting with the variables that had the highest p-value.9 
The OLS estimates in column (ii) were used to predict cattle prices which were subsequently 
inserted into the bilateral trade functions that were estimated with a Tobit model.10  
Table 2 reports the ML Tobit estimation of the system composed of equations (12) and 
(13) when cattle prices are instrumented according to (15). Column (i) reports the results of the 
basic specification. The elasticity of substitution ( )σ  is highly significant at the 1% level and 
has a value of 3.2, implying moderate substitutability in consumption between bovine meats of 
                                                 
8 Given the relatively low degree of significance of the independent variables in explaining cattle prices, we also 
implemented a robust M-estimator which consists of selecting different weights for each observation in order to 
control for the absolute size of the errors in the regression (Kennedy, 2003). When weights are equal to one, the 
estimator minimizes the sum of the absolute errors. The procedure is based on iterated weighted least squares. With 
the robust M-estimator, more policy variables have a significant impact on cattle prices, but the effects of several 
policy variables on the price of cattle were implausibly large. Therefore, we used the ordinary least square procedure 
to generate the instruments.  
 
9 Obviously, the distribution of the t-statistics in column (ii) of table 1 is subject to the well-known pre-estimation 
bias (Kennedy, 2003), but standard errors appear small relative to their coefficients. 
 
10 Because the logarithmic transformation of the trade volume is undefined when trade is null, we added one unit to 
all observed trade flows. 
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different origins. The estimate of the elasticity of transformation ( )γ  is relatively low at 1.9 
although its standard error is more than three times smaller. The low estimate of γ  is consistent 
with countries using non-tariff barriers. In the present case, the lack of harmonization in sanitary, 
phytosanitary and other technical regulations across importing countries implies that 
diversification is costly. The implied coefficient on distance is -2.4 for the primary cattle sector 
( )Iγ ψ− ×  and -1.9 for bovine meat ( )Mσ ψ− × . The estimates of the other parameters have the 
expected signs and are highly significant. The coefficient on the per-unit cost of cattle production 
( )α  is positive. The estimates of the cost parameters on cattle product and labour in the 
production of bovine meat, hθ  and wθ , are positive and significant while the coefficient for 
capital rent ( )rθ  has the wrong sign, but is not significantly different from zero. The value of β  
is larger than one and is consistent with the second order conditions of profit maximization.  
Column (ii) in Table 2 presents estimation results for a slightly different specification of 
the empirical model. These results explicitly account for the EU import embargo on hormone-
treated cattle/beef. It should be noted that part of the impact of the EU embargo is captured by 
the elasticity of transformation parameter, which measures frictions in substituting destinations 
in cattle trade, and through the cattle price in the EU. The import embargo may be seen as an 
exporting-country targeted policy that requires special attention. Although the embargo does not 
discriminate across countries per se (as it applies to all hormone-treated cattle/beef regardless of 
origin), it affects countries in which the use of growth hormones is widespread such as the US, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Hence, a dummy variable for all inward bilateral trade 
flows going to the EU and originating from these four countries was added to the specifications 
in (12) and (13). The dummy variable is significant at the ten percent level, but its inclusion did 
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not affect very much the estimates of the structural parameters considering how similar they are 
to the estimates in column (i).    
 
4. Trade liberalization scenarios 
The objective of this section is to determine the effects of various policy liberalization scenarios 
on trade flows using the estimated structural parameters reported in column (i) of Table 2. We 
simulate the following scenarios: 1) full liberalization which entails the elimination of tariffs and 
domestic and export subsidies; 2) the elimination of tariffs; 3) removal of export and domestic 
subsidies; and 4) a (hypothetical) Doha partial liberalization outcome. It is unknown at this stage 
what concessions are likely to emerge at the end of the Doha round, considering the disparity in 
the positions of member countries. Nevertheless, a few details have transpired through the 
official negotiating positions of some WTO members. Our Doha scenario thus includes the total 
removal of export subsidies as agreed to in the 2004 July framework (WTO, 2004) and a 50% 
cut in domestic support. The latter policy is based on the proposal by some countries to 
discipline product-specific domestic support and a 50% cut in trade-distorting domestic support 
emerges a reasonable and plausible compromise. Tariffs are also lowered depending on whether 
protection is in the form of a Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) or a tariff.11  The WTO 2004 July 
framework recognized the notion of sensitive products by stating that a “distinct treatment for 
tariff cuts” could be applied, as long as it does not prevent “substantial improvement” in market 
access (WTO, 2004).  Hence, the Doha scenario includes tariff cuts of 20% when there are TRQs 
and 50% in all other instances. It should be emphasized that non-tariff barriers remain in effect in 
all four scenarios.  
                                                 
11 TRQs are two-tier tariffs that were introduced at the outset of the UR because the UR tariffication process resulted 
in prohibitively high tariffs that threatened historic market access for several so-called sensitive products. In many 
cases, TRQs act de facto as import quotas as they set a binding level of imports because in-quota imports are taxed 
at a very low rate while over-quota imports would be taxed at a very high rate.   
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There is a considerable amount of intra-industry trade in the cattle/beef industry and thus 
the results of the liberalization scenarios are sorted out according to their impact on imports and 
exports. The results are presented in terms of changes (in %) relative to the status quo. Tables 3 
and 4 report the impacts of liberalization on exports and imports of cattle for selected countries, 
respectively. Tables 5 and 6 report the impacts of liberalization on exports and imports of bovine 
meat for selected countries, respectively. The results presented in Tables 3-6 pertain to a subset 
of important trading countries. For each of the four liberalization scenarios and each country, the 
shaded line describes the effect of liberalization in the cattle and meat sectors while the two lines 
below pertain to liberalization in cattle only and liberalization in meat only. The first line of each 
country-specific bloc of results in Tables 3-6 reports border effects. The latter are computed for 
both inward and outward trade flows of cattle and meat and are measured based on Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003) concept that contrasts fitted values of trade flows under tariff-only 
liberalization to the fitted values of trade under the current policy regime. We make a 
contribution to that particular strand of the literature because our framework allows for 
contrasting border effects for the tariff-only, subsidy-only and full liberalization scenarios. The 
latter serves as the baseline to which other trade liberalization scenarios and the status quo are 
compared. 
Formally, let ,ˆ
FT
iM ⋅  and ˆ
SQ
iM ⋅  measure respectively the fitted value of country i’s total 
beef imports under full liberalization (free trade) and the fitted value of country i’s beef imports 
under the status quo. The inward border effect reported in the full (liberalization) column is 
measured as , , ,ˆ ˆ
FT FT SQ
i i iBEM M M⋅ ⋅ ⋅≡ . In fact, it measures the border effect under the status quo.  A 
border effect in excess of one is indicative of a restricted market access under the status quo.  
Defining ,ˆ iM
τ
⋅  and ,ˆ
s
iM ⋅  as the fitted values of beef imports under tariff-only and subsidy-only 
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liberalization scenarios, we can define inward border effects for beef as: , , ,ˆ ˆ
FT
i i iBEM M M
τ τ
⋅ ⋅ ⋅≡  and 
, , ,
ˆ ˆs FT s
i i iBEM M M⋅ ⋅ ⋅≡ . These measure border effects that remain following the tariff-only and 
subsidy-only liberalization processes. By the same token, the inward border effect in the Doha 
liberalization scenario is defined as: , , ,ˆ ˆ
Doha FT Doha
i i iBEM M M⋅ ⋅ ⋅≡ . The last three border effect 
variables indicate what would happen if the liberalization process was to follow its full course 
once partial liberalization has been achieved. Similar border effects can be derived for trade in 
cattle. Let ,ˆ
FT
iI ⋅  be the fitted value of country i’s cattle imports under scenario x. The cattle inward 
border effects are thus: , , ,ˆ ˆ
FT FT SQ
i i iBEI I I⋅ ⋅ ⋅≡ , , , ,ˆ ˆFTi i iBEI I Iτ τ⋅ ⋅ ⋅≡ , , , ,ˆ ˆs FT si i iBEI I I⋅ ⋅ ⋅≡  and 
, , ,
ˆ ˆDoha FT Doha
i i iBEI I I⋅ ⋅ ⋅≡ . Finally, we can define outward border effects by computing fitted exports 
of country i under scenario x ( ), ,ˆ ˆ,x xi iM I⋅ ⋅  to obtain: , , ,ˆ ˆx FT xi i iBEM M M⋅ ⋅ ⋅≡  and , , ,ˆ ˆx FT xi i iBEI I I⋅ ⋅ ⋅≡ .  
As mentioned in the introduction, one advantage of the current methodology over CGE 
models is that it allows the computation of statistically-consistent confidence intervals around 
predicted impacts of trade liberalization scenarios. While the parameters of the model may be 
asymptotically normally distributed, it is difficult to derive the asymptotic distribution of 
predicted trade flows obtained from a Tobit model. We rely on the simulation techniques of 
Krinsky and Robb (1986, 1991) to approximate the distribution of the predicted trade patterns.12  
To get the gist of how the procedure can be implemented, consider the general type I Tobit 
model (Amemiya, 1985):  
{ } ( )* * 2; max 0, ; 0,i i i i i i iy v y y v N σ= + =x β x ∼   (16) 
                                                 
12 Standard bootstrapping methods are not appealing in this instance because the model is highly non-linear.   
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where the dependent variable iy  measures actual bilateral trade flows and the vector ix  
represents the policy variables and other exogenous covariates. The simulation exercise requires 
drawing from the joint asymptotic distribution of the parameters’ ML estimates βˆ . Let bβ  
denote a draw of a set of parameters. The liberalization scenarios involves fixing the independent 
variables to ix  and computing i iE y⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦x  when b=β β , which yields (Wooldridge, 2002):  
( ) ( )( )Pr 0 , 0
b
ib b
i i i i i i i i i b
i
E y y E y y
φ σσ σ σ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤ = ⎡ > ⎤ ⋅ ⎡ > ⎤ = Φ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟Φ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
x β
x x x x β x β
x β
       (17) 
with ( )φ ⋅  and ( )Φ ⋅  denoting the probability distribution and cumulative distribution functions 
respectively of the normal distribution. This exercise is repeated 1000 times. The simulated 
series for i iE y⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦x  is sorted in ascending order and the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile values are used 
as confidence interval bounds. The confidence intervals are reported for the Doha predicted trade 
flows in Tables 3-7 between brackets. 
 The most noticeable feature of the border effect estimates displayed in Tables 3-6 is that 
most of them are small relative to the border effects usually reported in the literature (e.g., 
Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003, 2004). In fact, many border estimates are below one, thus 
indicating that imports and exports under a distorted environment are larger than under full 
liberalization.  The structure of protection and intervention in agri-food industries explains this 
phenomenon as the interaction of tariff protection and support policies can easily produce border 
effects below unity. Furthermore, the relatively large border effects reported in other studies may 
be partially explained by the trade-related impacts of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and 
other technical barriers to trade that are accounted for in the current study by the elasticity of 
transformation parameter.       
  20
In Table 3, the EU outward border effect in the cattle sector is above one under full 
liberalization scenario. This indicates that EU cattle exports would increase if tariffs and 
subsidies were entirely eliminated. More specifically, full liberalization in both the cattle and 
beef sectors would induce a 5% increase in cattle exports.  If full liberalization was restricted to 
the cattle sector, EU cattle exports would drop by 17%, but full liberalization restricted to bovine 
meat trade would boost cattle exports by 18%. As expected, the EU border effect drops below 
unity for the subsidy-only scenario while the border effect of other exporting countries increases 
above unity. This shows that one’s domestic and export subsidies can seriously impact on the 
world market for meat and livestock products, as argued by Larue and Ker (1993). Moving to 
full liberalization from the status quo would increase cattle exports of Canada and Mexico. This 
contrasts with the decreases for the US and Australia under full liberalization. The confidence 
intervals regarding the changes in exports under the Doha scenario are quite wide. They span 
over considerable positive and negative values for the EU, the US and Australia.   
Table 4 indicates that the inward border effect in the EU for the cattle sector is 0.7 under 
full liberalization. This means that EU cattle imports would fall by 30% once border protection 
and subsidies on cattle and beef were eliminated. Relative to the status quo, US cattle imports 
would increase under all scenarios except under the tariff-only scenario which would cause a 
small reduction of 1.6%.  The inward border effects for Japan are well below one which means 
that its cattle imports would continue falling as all countries move from partial to full 
liberalization. The border effects for Brazil, Canada and Mexico indicate that these countries 
would experience import growth as they liberalize whether it is from the status quo or from a 
partial liberalization starting point. The confidence intervals about Doha outcomes for these three 
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countries reveal that their imports could grow by as little as 7% or by as much as 34%.  In 
contrast, EU cattle imports would fall by a percentage between 15.6% and 31.7%.   
The outward and inward border effects for beef trade for selected countries are reported 
in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. The EU outward border effect is 1.25 for the full liberalization 
scenario which suggests that total liberalization would lead to a 25 percent increase in EU meat 
exports compared to the current situation. The full liberalization scenario when restricted to 
cattle has very little impact on EU exports and imports of beef. This is largely due to the fact that 
non-tariff barriers remain effective under the liberalization scenarios. In contrast, EU beef 
exports would fall by 82% under the subsidy-only liberalization scenario (covering cattle and 
beef) compared to their current level. However, this negative impact on the processed product 
would be partially offset by the 19% increase in the primary product reported in Table 3. EU 
exports increase most under the tariff-only scenario. EU bovine meat exports drop sharply under 
the Doha scenario (60%). These results are consistent with the widely-held perception that 
subsidies in the EU have important distortions in export and import decisions. They also 
illustrate the “retaliatory” nature of import tariffs imposed by EU trading partners. The increase 
in the EU imports is remarkable, scoring a high of 1391% under the full liberalization scenario 
and 950% under the Doha scenario in Table 6. The EU confidence intervals in Tables 5 and 6 
illustrate the large extent by which a partial liberalization Doha scenario could drastically reduce 
exports and increase imports of beef. Such large changes would be difficult to cope with and this 
is why the EU has not been supportive of ambitious liberalization proposals in agriculture. The 
Doha liberalization scenario positively affects outward trade for the US (22%), Argentina (21%) 
and Australia (14%). Canada would see its current beef exports fall by 8-21% and its beef 
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imports increase by 5-16%. Still, full liberalization would have an even stronger impact on the 
Canadian beef industry.  
Table 7 reports the overall world border effect for the cattle and beef sectors. The border 
effect for cattle and beef under full liberalization is 1.13 and 1.18, respectively. This means that 
cattle and beef trade would increase by 13% and 18%, respectively. Glancing at the numbers for 
cattle-only and meat-only liberalization scenarios, it is obvious that reducing subsidies and tariff 
on beef only would have much more potent effects than doing the same for cattle only. Fully 
liberalizing beef would induce an 18% and a 12% increase in beef and cattle trade, respectively, 
while fully liberalizing the cattle sector would actually reduce beef exports by less than 0.1% and 
increase cattle trade by only 2.4%. The Doha scenario would increase cattle and beef trade by 
only 2.1% and 4.1%, respectively, but it would bring about significant changes in market shares 
among exporting countries.    
 
5. Conclusion  
The current round of multilateral talks at the WTO is at an important crossroad. While some 
progress has been made with respect to disciplining general forms of export subsidies, there are 
significant disparities between WTO members’ negotiating position on market access 
improvements and reductions in trade distorting domestic support. Most of the lessons that were 
learned from liberalizing trade in industrial products continue to hold in the current context, but 
the agri-food markets have important particularities that add a whole host of new issues requiring 
careful analysis. Trade-distorting support policies and the vertical linkages between upstream 
and downstream industries must be accounted for when evaluating the impacts of liberalizing 
agri-food trade. 
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We develop a gravity-based framework to explain bilateral trade flows of processed agri-
food commodities and primary agricultural products. The theoretical framework yields 
empirically tractable bilateral trade flow equations that are estimated to analyze the impacts of 
trade liberalization scenarios in the cattle/beef markets. The empirical model is a two-stage type I 
Tobit model which accounts for the significant number of zeros in trade flows between many 
country pairs and the simultaneity issue between the cattle bilateral export supply functions and 
meat import demand schedules.  
A number of trade liberalization scenarios are evaluated and the results of these critically 
hinge on two important structural parameters which are the elasticity of substitution for meat and 
the cattle elasticity of transformation. The substitution elasticity estimate implies that there is a 
significant product differentiation at the consumers’ level with respect to the source of the 
product. The low estimate of the elasticity of transformation suggests that there are significant 
impediments to substituting cattle exports across destinations from an exporting country’s 
perspective. One of the advantages of our econometric model over Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) models is that confidence intervals with respect to predicted impacts of trade 
liberalization can be obtained using conventional bootstrap methods.  
The first three selected trade liberalization scenarios feature the elimination of tariffs and 
domestic and export subsidies, the elimination of tariffs only and the elimination of subsidies.  
We also simulate a fourth scenario which calls for the elimination of export subsidies, the cutting 
in half of trade-distorting domestic subsidies and the implementation of tariff cuts that recognize 
the sensitive nature of the cattle/beef industry in some countries. Despite the uncertainty 
surrounding the future of the Doha round of multilateral talks, the latter scenario is interpreted as 
a potential Doha compromise. The US and Australia emerge as the exporting countries that stand 
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to benefit the most from cuts in tariffs and subsidies under the Doha and full liberalization 
scenarios, as beef imports in the European Union and Japan would significantly increase. Cattle 
US exports and imports respectively decrease and increase. Canada’s cattle imports would 
increase at a higher rate than its exports under the Doha and full liberalization scenarios. Also, 
Canada would experience deterioration in its beef trade position as its exports would decrease 
and its imports would increase under both scenarios. Finally, Argentina’s beef trade position 
would improve due to an increase in exports and a decrease in imports.  
Interesting comparisons can be made also across scenarios to detect which countries are 
likely to push or oppose aggressive cuts in tariffs and/or subsidies. For example, EU beef imports 
increase much more dramatically under the tariffs-only liberalization scenario than under the 
subsidies-only liberalization scenario, while for the US, reduction in beef imports are more 
pronounced when only subsidies are eliminated. Finally, overall trade in cattle and beef would 
not increase very much if both the cattle and beef sectors were fully liberalized, but the shares of 
exporting countries would change substantially. 
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Table 1. OLS estimates of the reduced form cattle price equation 
 
Variables  (i)  (ii) 
Land Rent  -0.06 
(0.15) 
 - 
Wage  0.22 
(0.16) 
 -0.133
(0.070) 
Price of Capital  -0.22 
(0.26) 
 - 
Remoteness   -1.02 
(0.66) 
 -0.982
(0.381) 
Intra-national Distance  0.05 
(0.20) 
 0.224
(0.121) 
Cattle output  0.20 
(0.25) 
 -0.188
(0.069) 
Meat output  -0.44 
(0.26) 
 - 
GDP  0.11 
(0.113) 
 - 
Applied tariffs (cattle)  -0.13 
(1.37) 
 - 
Applied tariffs (meat)  -1.26 
(0.70) 
 - 
Export subsidies (meat)  1.12 
(1.64) 
 - 
Domestic subsidy (meat)  0.25 
(0.65) 
 - 
Outward tariff (cattle)  -0.57 
(1.35) 
 - 
Outward tariff (meat)  -1.59 
(1.37) 
 - 
Inward export subsidy 
 (meat) 
 6.02 
(3.48) 
 - 
Inward export subsidy 
(meat) 
 -1.39 
(1.43) 
 - 
Notes: Standard errors are between parentheses. 
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Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimates of the structural parameters  
of the import demand and export supply schedules 
Parameters 
 Basic 
specification  (i) 
 EU 
embargo (ii) 
σ  
 
 3.249 
(0.286) 
 3.278
(0.292) γ   1.882 
(0.533) 
 1.957
(0.564) 
Mψ   0.570 
(0.066) 
 0.564
(0.066) 
Iψ   1.286 
(0.392) 
 1.232
(0.381) 
α   0.312 
(0.104) 
 0.295
(0.099) 
β   2.028 
(0.307) 
 1.994
(0.300) 
hθ   0.508 
(0.058) 
 0.514
(0.058) 
wθ   0.629 
(0.049) 
 0.621
(0.049) 
rθ   -0.137 
(0.071) 
 -0.135 
(0.070) 
Mυ   4.424 
(0.096) 
 4.419
(0.096) 
Iυ   4.768 
(0.123) 
 4.756
(0.122) 
Mκ   -3.392 
(1.058) 
 -3.469
(1.107) 
Iκ   12.038 
(1.156) 
 12.034
(1.178) 
Log-
likelihood 
 -2.733  -2.731 
Notes: Standard errors are between parentheses. A total of 
1,722 observations are available for each specification. 
Column (i) report the results of the maximum likelihood 
estimates of the basic model defined in (12) and (13) with 
the sum of the parameters for the meat cost function 
restricted to one in accordance with the constant returns to 
scale assumption. Column (ii) reports the results when a 
dummy accounting for the EU embargo on imports of 
hormone-treated cattle/beef is included. The maximum 
likelihood function is maximized using the BFGS 
algorithm (Davidson and McKinnon, 2004).  
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Table 3. Impacts of various liberalization 
scenarios on exports of cattle for selected 
countries 
    Liberalization scenarios 
 
Country 
 Liberalized 
Sectors 
  
Full 
  
Subsidy 
  
Tariff 
  
Doha 
European  
Union 
 Border Effect  1.05  0.88  1.08  1.05 
 %∆  (both sectors)  4.71  18.91  -3.07  -0.51 
[-7.90;18.70] 
 %∆  (cattle)  -17.17  0.00  -17.17   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  17.91  18.91  17.25   
United 
States 
 Border Effect  0.95  1.04  0.89  0.97 
 %∆  (both sectors)  -5.30  -8.97  6.65  -2.39 
[-13.53;5.09] 
 %∆  (cattle)  12.79  0.00  12.79   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  -10.17  -8.97  -4.66   
Australia 
 Border Effect  0.96  1.06  0.97  1.09 
 %∆  (both sectors)  -4.20  -9.21  -1.12  0.99 
[-8.28;7.22] 
 %∆  (cattle)  6.72  0.00  6.72   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  -6.97  -9.21  -4.30   
Canada 
 Border Effect  1.08  1.01  1.04  1.01 
 %∆  (both sectors)  7.84  6.31  3.73  6.26 
[-2.73;13.57] 
 %∆  (cattle)  11.99  0.00  11.99   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  0.09  6.31  -7.01   
Mexico 
 Border Effect  1.11  1.03  1.07  1.03 
 %∆  (both sectors)  10.77  7.08  3.13  7.91 
[-0.35;15.16] 
 %∆  (cattle)  9.49  0.00  9.49   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  3.13  7.08  -5.64   
Note: The numbers between brackets under the Doha scenario represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the 
trade liberalization impacts. The border effect for full liberalization is defined as: ,. ,. ,.ˆ ˆ/
FT FT SQ
i i iBEM M M≡  , where 
FT stands for free trade and SQ for status quo. For the other scenarios, the border effect captures the change in 
exports from moving from partial liberalization scenario x to free trade: ,. ,. ,.ˆ ˆ/
x FT x
i i iBEM M M≡ . Conversely, the 
percentage figures for each liberalization scenario are computed with respect to the status quo situation.  
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Table 4. Impacts of various liberalization scenarios on imports of cattle for selected 
countries 
 
    Liberalization scenarios 
 
Country 
 Liberalized 
Sectors 
  
Full 
  
Subsidy 
  
Tariff 
  
Doha 
European  
Union 
 Border Effect  0.70  1.46  0.30  0.87 
 %∆  (both sectors)  -29.85  -51.93  130.79  -19.79 
[-31.67;-15.62] 
 %∆  (cattle)  161.07  0.00  161.07   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  -73.13  -51.93  -11.60   
United 
States 
 Border Effect  1.18  0.99  1.20  1.04 
 %∆  (both sectors)  17.98  18.69  -1.56  13.50 
[6.30;23.94] 
 %∆  (cattle)  6.40  0.00  6.40   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  10.88  18.69  -7.47   
Japan 
 Border Effect  0.26  0.65  0.35  0.42 
 %∆  (both sectors)  -74.29  -60.66  -27.21  -38.14 
[-45.56;-27.85] 
 %∆  (cattle)  -0.27  0.00  -0.27   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  -74.22  -60.66  27.01   
Brazil 
 Border Effect  1.34  1.18  1.17  1.14 
 %∆  (both sectors)  33.66  13.19  14.29  17.61 
[9.96;28.35] 
 %∆  (cattle)  4.28  0.00  4.28   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  28.18  13.19  9.60   
Canada 
 Border Effect  1.28  1.07  1.21  1.07 
 %∆  (both sectors)  27.94  19.56  6.13  19.57 
[11.74;34.09] 
 %∆  (cattle)  -0.63  0.00  -0.63   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  28.75  19.56  6.80   
Mexico 
 Border Effect  1.25  1.08  1.18  1.07 
 %∆  (both sectors)  25.18  15.39  6.52  17.32 
[7.14;26.33] 
 %∆  (cattle)  8.56  0.00  8.56   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  15.32  15.39  -1.88   
Note: The numbers between brackets under the Doha scenario represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the 
trade liberalization impacts.  The border effect for full liberalization is defined as: ,. ,. ,.ˆ ˆ/
FT FT SQ
i i iBEI I I≡  , where FT 
stands for free trade and SQ for status quo.  For the other scenarios, the border effect captures the change in exports 
from moving from partial liberalization scenario x to free trade: ,. ,. ,.ˆ ˆ/
x FT x
i i iBEI I I≡ . Conversely, the percentage 
figures for each liberalization scenario are computed with respect to the status quo situation. 
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Table 5. Impacts of various liberalization scenarios on exports of bovine meat for selected 
countries 
 
    Liberalization scenarios 
 
Country 
 Liberalized 
Sectors 
  
Full 
  
Subsidy 
  
Tariff 
  
Doha 
European  
Union 
 Border Effect  1.25  7.07  0.66  3.12 
 %∆  (both sectors)  24.87  -82.33  87.98  -59.94 
[-68.49;-44.66] 
 %∆  (cattle)  1.40  0.00  1.40   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  23.15  -82.33  85.39   
United 
States 
 Border Effect  1.73  1.86  0.92  1.42 
 %∆  (both sectors)  72.85  -7.81  86.65  21.87 
[14.06;26.16] 
 %∆  (cattle)  -1.48  0.00  -1.48   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  75.43  -7.81  89.44   
Argentina 
 Border Effect  1.44  1.39  1.02  1.20 
 %∆  (both sectors)  44.17  3.91  41.97  20.51 
[12.54;27.12] 
 %∆  (cattle)  0.60  0.00  0.60   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  43.31  3.91  41.12   
Australia 
 Border Effect  1.33  1.24  1.03  1.16 
 %∆  (both sectors)  32.51  7.00  28.61  13.88 
[3.74;20.85] 
 %∆  (cattle)  -0.01  0.00  -0.01   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  32.53  7.00  28.62   
Brazil 
 Border Effect  1.02  1.03  0.95  1.01 
 %∆  (both sectors)  1.78  -1.14  7.38  1.31 
[-4.81;5.06] 
 %∆  (cattle)  -0.10  0.00  -0.10   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  1.88  -1.14  7.48   
Canada 
 Border Effect  0.84  0.99  0.84  0.96 
 %∆  (both sectors)  -15.84  -15.36  -0.38  -12.43 
[-20.46;-7.96] 
 %∆  (cattle)  -0.46  0.00  -0.46   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  -15.45  -15.36  0.08   
Note: The numbers between brackets under the Doha scenario represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the 
trade liberalization impacts. The border effect for full liberalization is defined as: ,. ,. ,.ˆ ˆ/
FT FT SQ
i i iBEM M M≡  , where FT 
stands for free trade and SQ for status quo. For the other scenarios, the border effect captures the change in exports 
from moving from partial liberalization scenario x to free trade: ,. ,. ,.ˆ ˆ/
x FT x
i i iBEM M M≡ . Conversely, the percentage 
figures for each liberalization scenario are computed with respect to the status quo situation. 
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Table 6. Impacts of various liberalization scenarios on imports of bovine meat for selected 
countries 
    Liberalization scenarios 
 
Country 
 Liberalized 
Sectors 
  
Full 
  
Subsidy 
  
Tariff 
  
Doha 
European  
Union 
 Border Effect  14.91  5.68  1.42  3.76 
 %∆  (both sectors)  1390.88  162.48  950.12  296.65 
[165.73;444.50] 
 %∆  (cattle)  4.54  0.00  4.54   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  1340.86  162.48  919.22   
United 
States 
 Border Effect  0.88  0.99  0.86  0.95 
 %∆  (both sectors)  -11.71  -11.52  -0.34  -7.39 
[-12.20;-5.50] 
 %∆  (cattle)  -0.04  0.00  -0.04   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  -11.71  -11.52  -0.31   
Japan 
 Border Effect  1.84  1.44  1.03  1.34 
 %∆  (both sectors)  84.31  28.07  79.41  37.69 
[19.45;59.22] 
 %∆  (cattle)  0.05  0.00  0.05   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  84.31  28.07  79.42   
Argentina 
 Border Effect  0.89  1.03  0.84  0.96 
 %∆  (both sectors)  -11.06  -13.66  6.47  -7.47 
[-18.44;-1.73] 
 %∆  (cattle)  -0.04  0.00  -0.04   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  -11.02  -13.66  6.52   
Brazil 
 Border Effect  1.05  1.29  0.80  1.07 
 %∆  (both sectors)  5.43  -18.44  32.04  -1.76 
[-14.50;4.70] 
 %∆  (cattle)  0.25  0.00  0.25   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  5.15  -18.44  31.88   
Canada 
 Border Effect  1.19  1.27  0.92  1.07 
 %∆  (both sectors)  19.35  -6.19  29.76  11.33 
[5.04;15.76] 
 %∆  (cattle)  -0.89  0.00  -0.89   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  20.54  -6.19  31.09   
Mexico 
 Border Effect  1.13  1.43  0.79  1.12 
 %∆  (both sectors)  13.29  -20.77  43.70  0.91 
[-8.82;6.00] 
 %∆  (cattle)  -0.73  0.00  -0.73   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  14.21  -20.77  44.94   
South 
Korea 
 Border Effect  1.22  1.46  0.86  1.17 
 %∆  (both sectors)  22.06  16.64  42.45  4.04 
[-8.32;10.40] 
 %∆  (cattle)  0.07  0.00  0.07   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  22.04  16.64  42.43   
Note: The numbers between brackets under the Doha scenario represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the 
trade liberalization impacts. The border effect for full liberalization is defined as: ,. ,. ,.ˆ ˆ/
FT FT SQ
i i iBEI I I≡  , where FT 
stands for free trade and SQ for status quo.  For the other scenarios, the border effect captures the change in exports 
from moving from partial liberalization scenario x to free trade: ,. ,. ,.ˆ ˆ/
x FT x
i i iBEI I I≡ . Conversely, the percentage 
figures for each liberalization scenario are computed with respect to the status quo situation. 
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Table 7. Impacts of trade liberalization on world trade 
    Liberalization scenarios 
 
Sector 
 Liberalized 
Sectors 
  
Full 
 
 
 
Subsidy 
  
Tariff 
  
Doha  
Cattle  
 
 Border Effect  1.13  1.09  1.06  1.04 
 %∆  (both sectors)  12.93  3.24  6.25  4.07 
[-1.97;10.91] 
 %∆  (cattle)  2.42  0.00  2.42   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  11.62  3.24  4.48   
Bovine 
meat  
 
 Border Effect  1.18  1.27  0.95  1.02 
 %∆  (both sectors)  18.41  -6.41  24.84  2.06 
[-4.40;4.52] 
 %∆  (cattle)  -0.03  0.00  -0.03   
 %∆  (bovine meat)  17.92  -6.41  24.61   
Note: The numbers between brackets under the Doha scenario represent the 95 percent confidence interval for 
the trade liberalization impacts. The border effect for full liberalization is defined as: ˆ ˆ/FT FT SQBEM M M≡  , 
where FT stands for free trade and SQ for status quo. For the other scenarios, the border effect captures the 
change in exports from moving from partial liberalization scenario x to free trade: ˆ ˆ/x FT xBEM M M≡ . 
Conversely, the percentage figures for each liberalization scenario are computed with respect to the status quo 
situation. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1A-List of Countries 
European Union Colombia Indonesia Philippines 
United States Costa Rica Israel South Africa 
Japan Dominican Rep. Korea Rep. Sri Lanka 
Argentina Ecuador Malaysia Syria 
Australia Egypt Mexico Thailand 
Bangladesh Ethiopia New Zealand Turkey 
Bolivia El Salvador Nigeria Uruguay 
Brazil Ghana Norway Venezuela 
Cameroon Guatemala Pakistan Zimbabwe 
Canada Honduras Panama  
Chile India Peru  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
